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PROMOTING EFFECTIVE ETHICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IN LARGE LAW FIRMS:
A CALL FOR RESEARCH AND REPORTING
Elizabeth Chambliss* and David B. Wilkins**
I. INTRODUCTION
Law firm policies and procedures are still private to a large extent and
thus discussion of them is akin to exploring folklore.'
United States lawyers increasingly practice in large, structurally
complex organizations.2 This is particularly true in the corporate client
sector, with the growth and globalization of law firms and emergence of
new organizational forms, such as multinational and multidisciplinary
partnerships However, it also is increasingly true in the individual
* Research Director, Program on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School.
** Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Program on the Legal Profession,
Harvard Law School. We are grateful to Robert A. Creamer, Vice President and Loss Prevention
Counsel, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, and to the participants in the Ethics and Law
Workshop at Harvard Business School for their helpful comments on the Article. Research for this
Article was funded by the Open Society Institute.
1. Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing
Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1568 (1993).
2. The percentage of private practitioners working in law firms with fifty or more lawyers
increased from 7.3% in 1980 to 18% in 1998. See BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 13-
14 (1985) (providing the 1980 figure); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 13 (4th ed. forthcoming 2002) (providing the 1998 figure).
3. In 1960, the thirty-eight largest U.S. law firms ranged from 50 to 100 lawyers. See, e.g.,
MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
BIG LAW FIRM 22 (1991). In 2000, the fifty largest U.S. firms ranged from 531 to 2771 lawyers, and
the 250 largest all had more than 150 lawyers. See Law.com, The NLJ 250, at
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/nlj
2 50/nlj2 50 2000_.fin.htmi (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
Most of the largest U.S. law firms have offices in more than one country. See The Global 50 Survey,
AM. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 86, passim.
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client sector, with the emergence of the franchise form,' the growth of
prepaid legal service networks,5 and the move toward multidisciplinary
practice by social service providers.6
The growth of law firms and the emergence of new organizational
forms have strained the profession's individualistic approach to lawyer
regulation. Because lawyers increasingly practice in large organizations,
professional regulation increasingly depends on the development of
"ethical infrastructure" within firms; that is, on organizational policies,
procedures and incentives for promoting compliance with ethical rules.
To avoid conflicts of interest, for instance, some large, multi-office
law firms have instituted centralized screening procedures, backed (more
or less) by administrative incentives, i.e., you cannot get a billing
number until you get a conflicts clearance! Some firms also have special
supervisory procedures for issuing audit and opinion letters and for the
management of client funds.9 Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that
large law firms increasingly rely on in-house ethics advisors, firm
general counsel, and other internal specialists to manage the firm's
compliance with ethics and malpractice regulation.'0
4. See JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL
LEGAL SERVICES 2-5 (1997) (discussing the rise of the franchise form and its effect on the delivery
of legal services).
5. The number of Americans covered by some type of prepaid legal plan has grown from an
estimated 13 million in 1987 to 152 million in 2000. See Alec M. Schwartz, A Lawyer's Guide to
Prepaid Legal Services, LEGAL ECON., July/Aug. 1989, at 43, 43 (providing the 1987 figure);
National Resource Center for Consumers of Legal Services, 2000 Legal Services Plan Census, at
http://www.nrccls.org/Publications/legaLCensus/20001.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) (providing
the 2000 figure). For a discussion of the effects of this increase on the size and management of law
firms, see Carroll Seron, Managing Entrepreneurial Legal Services: The Transformation of Small-
Firm Practice, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION 63, 63-92 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
6. See generally Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives:
Multidisciplinary Practices For People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000) (tracing the emergence and
organizational structure of multidisciplinary practices serving low and moderate income people).
7. We borrow this term from Professor Ted Schneyer. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four
Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX.
L. REV. 245, 246 (1998).
8. See Krysten Crawford, A Marriage of Convenience, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 110, 113,
140 (describing the conflicts checking system at Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells Pander). The
point about administrative incentives comes from our own research.
9. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 285-86 (1997)
[hereinafter Fortney, Law Firm Partners] (reporting the results of a survey of 191 law finns); Volk
et al., supra note 1, at 1571-74 (reporting the results of a survey of twenty-six law firms).
10. See David Hricik, Uncertainty, Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice
in Texas, 16 REV. LrrIG. 705, 706 (1997) ("Most large law firms have their own in-house ethics
gums, people who are expected to set policy and provide ethics advice on internal matters,
malpractice claims, and similar issues."); Jonathan M. Epstein, Note, The In-House Ethics Advisor:
[Vol. 30:691
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Despite the increasing importance of such ethical infrastructure, we
know very little about firms' current practices, or how to motivate
improvement where necessary. The empirical literature consists of a
handful of small and/or regional surveys" and a case study of in-house
ethics advising in one Oregon firm.'2 Though these studies provide
important data about some forms of ethical infrastructure, many basic
questions remain. 
3
Further, legal ethics scholarship has been slow to incorporate
research from other organizational contexts. Most law review articles
calling for improved supervision within law firms begin with a few
egregious examples of supervisory failure, and conclude by calling for
direct regulation of law firms by state disciplinary authorities.' 4 Bar
regulators, too, have focused primarily on the desirability of direct
regulation under Model Rule 5.1(a). 5 Yet research on the regulation of
Practical Benefits for the Modem Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1028-29 (1994); Peter
R. Jarvis, Ethics Advisors Watch Over Firms, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 15; Daniel B. Kennedy,
New Trend is General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 29, 29; Gary Taylor, Counsel to
Firms Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like Their Clients, to Look Inside for
Advice, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al.
11. See generally Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9 (reviewing a survey of peer
review procedures in 191 Texas law firms); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study
of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69
UMKC L. REV. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Fortney, Soul for Sale] (discussing a survey of billing
practices of 487 associates working in Texas law firms); Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Veriti: Do Rules
About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV.
305 (1997) (reporting findings of survey of conflicts screening procedures in thirty-one law firms);
Volk et al., supra note 1 (providing results of a survey of various policies and procedures in twenty-
six law firms).
12. See generally Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice,
14 NOTRE DAME J.L. Enucs & PuB. POL'Y 103 (2000) (describing their own in-house ethics
practice).
13. Fortunately, additional research is on the way. Susan P. Shapiro, a Senior Research
Fellow at the American Bar Foundation ("ABF"), is about to publish a groundbreaking study about
how lawyers identify and manage conflicts of interest on a day-to-day basis. See generally SUSAN P.
SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (forthcoming 2002).
Her forthcoming study, based on interviews with lawyers in a random sample of 128 Illinois law
firms, will be a major contribution to the empirical literature in this area. Shapiro discusses a
sampling of cases from her study (involving particularly difficult conflicts) in a recent symposium
article. See generally Susan P. Shapiro, Everests of the Mundane: Conflicts of Interest in Real-
World Legal Practice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2000).
14. See generally Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11; Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking:
Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999); Irwin
D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Lawyers' Supervisory Duties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259 (1994); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
CORNELLL. REv. 1 (1991).
15. Model Rule 5.1(a) requires law firm partners to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to
the rules of professional conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2001). Recently,
2002]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
organizations in other contexts suggests that the effectiveness of external
regulation depends significantly on the scope and effectiveness of
compliance procedures within firms.' 6 Thus, the firm remains the central
arena-and agent-of regulation.
This Article proposes a research agenda for the study of ethical
infrastructure in large law firms. This exercise has a dual purpose. First,
we recently began a research project addressing some of the questions
that we outline below, and we are eager for critical feedback from
practitioners, regulators and scholars. Second, we hope to encourage
others to engage in similar research. We believe that systematic research
and reporting could contribute significantly to the development of
effective ethical infrastructure by increasing the visibility of law firm
policies and procedures and by promoting "best practices" within firms.
Our proposed research agenda is organized around three central
questions. The first is a basic descriptive question: What are firms
doing? What types of ethical infrastructure have law firms created? And
how much variation exists among firms? Law firms generally can be
described as tending toward progressively formal management and
internal specialization as firms move from smaller and collegial to
larger, more bureaucratic forms. 7 Yet many lawyers are resistant to the
rationalization of law firm management, because it interferes with
personal authority relations and constrains individual lawyers'
two states, New York and New Jersey, amended their state versions of this rule to apply to law
firms as entities, in addition to individual partners. See N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
1-102A (1999); N.J. CT. R. ANN. R. 1:20-150) (1999). The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission also
considered, but ultimately rejected, entity regulation under Rule 5.1(a). See Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, ABA, Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof't Conduct, Changes from the
November 2000 Report to the May 2001 Report, at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-chan-jun.html
(last visited Mar. 14, 2002) (explaining the rationale behind rejecting entity regulation).
16. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 25-35, 106-19 (1992) (noting the limits of punitive approaches to
organizational regulation and the comparative advantages of "enforced self-regulation"); Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Lnv,
97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1542-47 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity] (examining
employers' responses to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two
Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC.
REV. 794, 795-96 (1996) (examining the role of employers in defining strategies for compliance
with equal employment law); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal
Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 479, 505-06 (1997) [hereinafter Edelman &
Suchman, Legal Environments] (reviewing research on the role of organizations in constructing the
meaning of regulatory compliance); Mark Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths:
The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 903-04
(1996) (book review) [hereinafter Suchman & Edelman, Legal Rational Myths].
17. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 4849; ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH
POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OFTHE LARGE LAW FIRM 147-50 (1988).
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autonomy.' To what extent has the rationalization of law firm
management extended to the creation of specialized structures for self-
regulation? What types of ethical and regulatory issues are most likely to
be handled by formal policies and procedures?
The second question concerns the incentives for firms to create
ethical infrastructure. What types of firms are most likely to create
internal ethics controls? How important are organizational imperatives,
such as size? What is the role of professional discipline and other forms
of direct regulation? What is the role of private compliance specialists,
such as insurers and in-house ethics advisors? What is the role of
clients? In our own research, we are interested particularly in the role of
in-house compliance specialists, such as ethics advisors and firm general
counsel. We view firms' increasing reliance on in-house specialists as a
particularly important development because research shows that such
specialists may play a critical role in defining the operational standards
for "compliance."' 9
Finally, the $64,000 question: How effective are formal policies
and procedures in promoting ethical conduct within firms? How do
formal policies and procedures relate to informal incentives and
practices; that is, to the ethical culture of the firm? And what are the
standards for measuring "effectiveness?" This most important question
is also the most difficult to research-especially for researchers outside
the firm. Concerns about confidentiality and potential liability make law
firm managers extremely skittish about providing the kind of access that
would make an external assessment possible. Here, then, we argue for
shifting the primary research responsibility to firms, and suggest some
means for encouraging self-study.
Part II of the Article reviews the findings from existing research on
law firm ethical infrastructure. Part III explains our research agenda and
our working hypotheses. We conclude by proposing some strategies for
additional research and reporting in this increasingly important area.
18. See NELSON, supra note 17, at 86-124, 231-90 (discussing the tension between
organizational imperatives and professional ideology); Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational
Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 714-15 (1997) (reporting that
partners in some large law firms routinely bypass formal assignment systems).
19. See Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 16, at 498-501 (reviewing
research on the role of lawyers and other internal specialists in shaping organizations' responses to
regulation); Elizabeth Chambliss & Lauren B. Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal
Employment Law, in LAW'S DISCIPLINARY ENCOUNTERS: READINGS IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
(Victoria Saker Woeste et al. eds., forthcoming n.d.-under review at Univ. of Chi. Press)




II. REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH
By far the most systematic research on law firm ethical
infrastructure to date are two surveys conducted in Texas by Professor
Susan Saab Fortney.20 The first survey, conducted in 1995, focused on
peer review within firms; that is, "'the process in which law firm
partners or principals monitor and evaluate the job performance of their
colleagues.' 2' The survey inquired about a number of specific peer
review procedures as well as about respondents' attitudes toward peer
review generally.22 The survey was sent to the managing partners of all
Texas law firms with ten or more lawyers (n = 311), and yielded 191
responses for a response rate of 61.4%.2'
The second survey, conducted in 1999, focused on law firm billing
practices and the effects of billable hour requirements on associate
satisfaction.24 The survey also included general questions about the
ethical infrastructure of the firm.2 The survey was sent to a random
sample of 883 Texas associates who practice in firms with at least ten
lawyers and are subject to billable hour requirements. 6 Over half of the
associates returned the survey (n = 487) for a response rate of 55.2%.27
In addition to Professor Fortney's work, there are two other,
smaller surveys that provide some interesting data. One is a 1992 survey
conducted by three partners at Shearman & Sterling that asked about law
firm policies and procedures in twelve specific areas: firm and personal
investments; directorships and trusteeships; new clients; opinion and
audit letters; client funds; new lawyers; ancillary services; speaking,
writing, and expert testimony; outside employment; supervision, training
and evaluation of associates; claims and publicity; and computer and
office systems. The survey was sent to senior partners at fifty law firms
and twenty-six responded.29 The authors provide no information about
the size or location of firms or the original sampling criteria.
20. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9; Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11.
21. Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 280. The term "'colleagues' refers to other
partners or principals." Id. at 280 n.52.
22. See id. app. at 313-16.
23. See id. at 275-77.
24. See Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11, at 243.
25. See id. at 253-57.
26. See id. at 243-44, 243 n.18.
27. See id. at 243-44.
28. See Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1568-81.
29. See id. at 1569.
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The second is a 1997 survey by Professor Lee A. Pizzimenti about
the use of conflicts screens within firms." The survey was sent to
managing partners in a nonrandom sample of 156 law firms located in
Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Oregon (the four states that allow
screening when lawyers move between private firms).3 All firms in the
original sample had at least fifty lawyers.32 Unfortunately, only twenty
percent of those surveyed responded, 33 perhaps in part because the
survey was twenty-five pages long.' Professor Pizzimenti provides no
information about the characteristics of respondents versus
nonrespondents.
A. Descriptive Findings: What Are Firms Doing?
The surveys provide relatively detailed findings about the existence
of specific forms of ethical infrastructure. For instance, the surveys agree
that almost all law firms have a formal procedure for identifying
conflicts of interest,S and seventy-five percent of firm managers in the
peer review survey report that they periodically monitor partners'
compliance with conflicts procedures. 6 Most firms also have formal
policies or procedures regarding directorships,37 trusteeships, s and audit
opinion letters. 39 Firms appear to be less likely to have formal procedures
to monitor business transactions with clients. Only half of the firms in
the peer review survey report that they monitor partner investments in
business ventures with clients,4 and only five firms in the Shearman &
30. See Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 320-33.
31. See id. at 321.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 321 n.68.
35. See id. at 322 (reporting that all firms surveyed consult a client index before opening a
new matter, and that most also circulate an office memorandum); Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1580
(reporting that all twenty-six firms surveyed had a computerized conflicts checking system).
36. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 285.
37. See id. at 282-83 (reporting that sixty-percent of firms monitor or prohibit principals from
serving as directors of for-profit entities); Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1570 (reporting that twenty-
five of twenty-six firms require approval before lawyers may serve as directors for for-profit
entities, and one firm prohibits it altogether).
38. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 283 (reporting that fifty-four percent of
firms monitor or prohibit principals from serving as trustees); Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1570
(reporting that seventeen of twenty-six firms require approval before lawyers may serve as trustees).
39. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 287 (reporting that seventy-six percent
of firms require partner approval of audit opinion letters); Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1574
(reporting that twenty-five of twenty-six firms require partner approval of audit opinion letters, and
sixteen require centralized filing of all audit response letters).
40. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 284.
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Sterling survey report that they require prior approval of stock trades.41
Most firms also lack formal procedures for monitoring the withdrawal of
client funds. Only thirty-five percent of firms in the peer review survey42
and ten firms in the Shearman & Sterling survey43 require a second
partner's signature for the withdrawal of client funds.
The surveys are somewhat less informative regarding more general
purpose ethical infrastructure, in part because they ask different
questions and with varying specificity. For instance, the surveys report
that most firms have a policy or system for addressing ethical questions,
but it is unclear from the survey questions precisely what systems firms
have in place. In the peer review survey, Professor Fortney asked;
"[d]oes your firm have a principal or committee designated to [h]andle
ethics or malpractice problems?"44 and seventy-three percent of firms
reported that they do.4 ' The Shearman & Sterling survey asked; "[d]oes
your firm have a policy and system for dealing with ethical concerns of
lawyers?" and twenty-five of twenty-six firms reported that they do.4
Professor Pizzimenti asked whether there "[i]s ... a committee within
the firm to identify, discuss and resolve [ethical or professional] issues?"
and, if so, "at what intervals it meets. ' 70.4% of firms reported that
they have an ethics committee48 but most meet only on an ad hoc basis.49
Although the survey includes other interesting questions about the
composition and jurisdiction of ethics committees, and the authority of
the designated ethics partner, if any,5° Professor Pizzimenti does not
report the results of those questions.
Not surprisingly, the most detailed findings relate to the specific
issues that the surveys address; that is, peer review, billing and conflicts
screening. On the whole, the findings are troubling, in that most firms
appear to lack formal procedures for self-regulation in these areas. As to
peer review, for example, only half of the firms surveyed reported
41. See Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1569.
42. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 284.
43. See Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1575.
44. Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, app. at 314.
45. See id. at 289.
46. Volk et al., supra note 1, at 1578.
47. Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 353.
48. See id. at 322. It is unclear what number of firms this percentage represents, because
Professor Pizzimenti does not report raw numerical data. This is problematic given the small
number of respondents. Professor Pizzimenti reports that only twenty percent of 156 firms
responded, which translates to thirty-one firms. See id. at 321. However, there is no number divided
by thirty-one that equals 70.4%. See id. at 322. This problem persists throughout the article.
49. See id. at 322.
50. See id. at 353.
[Vol. 30:691
PROMOTING ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
engaging in any form of peer review, and those predominantly on an
informal basis."' Most firms do not monitor partners' compliance with
internal procedures other than conflicts and billing procedures; 52 and
only ten percent of firms have formal procedures for reviewing partners'
work (other than a review conducted in connection with compensation
decisions).53
Likewise, as to billing, only 40% of associates surveyed reported
that their firms have formal billing guidelines other than those imposed
by clients," and 66% reported that, during the previous year, their
supervisor had never questioned their billings.5 Fully 26% of associates
said that they received no instruction on billing when they joined the
firm, and 35% reported that they received less than one hour of
instruction.56 Almost half of those surveyed agreed with the statement
that "[b]illing pressure causes ethical and competent attorneys to leave
private law practice."57
Finally, as to conflicts of interest and the use of conflicts screens,
Professor Pizzimenti finds that many law firms "do not solicit all the
information they need to protect themselves" from conflicts; 5 and that,
upon discovering a conflict after a lawyer joins the firm, sixty-five
percent of firms would proceed with a screen without seeking former
clients' permission.59 Professor Pizzimenti concludes that while "a large
majority of responding firms take conflicts seriously," they are
hampered by "flawed conflicts detection" and "flawed systems for
maintaining screens."'
Overall, then, the surveys suggest that ethical infrastructure is
underdeveloped in most law firms. Though many firms have policies
and procedures to deal with specific ethical issues, many others lack
such procedures; and even firms that have formal procedures have few
mechanisms for monitoring compliance. Further, even in the area most
likely to be governed by formal procedures-that is, conflicts-existing
procedures appear to be flawed.
51. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 289.
52. See id. at 284-85.
53. See id. at 290.
54. See Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11, at 253.
55. See id. at 256.
56. See id. at 254.
57. Id. at 279.
58. See Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 324.
59. See id. at 326-67.
60. Id. at 333.
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B. Incentives for Firms to Create Ethical Infrastructure
None of the surveys asked directly why firms adopted specific
procedures or about the timing of adoption. Instead, the authors appear
to assume that firms are motivated primarily by the content of formal
rules and the fear of liability--despite their own findings that firms'
procedures, in most respects, are inadequate from this standpoint. Thus,
the existing literature provides no data about the relative importance of
direct regulation or other incentives for firms to create ethical
infrastructure.
Professor Fortney finds that firm size is an important variable,
however, which suggests that the development of ethical infrastructure
stems in part from organizational imperatives.61 In the peer review
survey, for example, Professor Fortney finds that firms with at least fifty
lawyers are more likely than smaller firms to designate a partner or
committee to handle ethics and malpractice matters;62 and more likely to
designate a partner or committee to handle risk management and quality
assurance.63 Larger firms are also more likely to rely on formal
procedures for reviewing partners' work.6 Professor Fortney concludes
that "the larger the firm, the more likely it is to be more bureaucratic,
imposing more controls on the conduct of principals." 65
Similarly, in the billing survey, associates in firms with more than
100 lawyers are more likely than associates in smaller firms to report
that their firm has general purpose ethical infrastructure, such as a
designated ethics partner, an ethics committee, scheduled ethics training,
and a written policy encouraging the reporting of misconduct.6 For
instance, 56% of associates working in 100-plus-lawyer firms report that
their firm has designated ethics counsel, compared to 35% of associates
from firms with 25-100 lawyers.67 Professor Fortney does not report the
total number of firms represented in the sample, and some firms may be
represented by more than one associate. Nevertheless, the findings are
instructive, and consistent with the findings from the peer review survey.
61. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 289.
62. See id. at 289 & n.107 (reporting that all firms with at least fifty lawyers have an ethics
partner or committee, compared to 87% of firms with twenty-six to fifty lawyers, and 60% of firms
with twenty-five or fewer lawyers).
63. See id. at 289 n.107. (reporting that 86% of firms with at least fifty lawyers have a risk
management partner or committee, compared to 70% of firms with twenty-six to fifty lawyers, and
52% of firms with twenty-five or fewer lawyers).
64. Seeid.at290&n.113.
65. Id.at291.




The peer review survey also supports the notion that lawyers tend
to resist formal management because they view it as impinging on their
individual autonomy and personal relationships with clients. Professor
Fortney finds that concerns about autonomy are the main obstacle to
peer review. s Many lawyers also cite specialization as an obstacle to
peer review.69 Close to half of respondents believe that partners can only
be effectively monitored by partners in the same area of practice; and
twenty-one percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement
that "'[u]nlike accounting or medicine, lawyering skills cannot be easily
evaluated or monitored."' 70
Professor Fortney concludes that firms with a team culture are more
likely to implement peer review than firms that function "as a
confederation of individual practitioners."7' Citing management
consulting literature, she emphasizes the economic benefits of a team
approach, and urges firm leaders to take proactive steps to shape a
positive culture in the firm.72 She notes, however, that taking proactive
steps means, primarily, changing firm structures-such as monitoring
and compensation structures-which points to the difficulties of
specifying the relationship between "culture" and "structure."73 We
return to this issue in Part HI.74
C. Measuring the Effectiveness of Ethical Infrastructure
All four surveys criticize the relative lack of ethical infrastructure
within firms, but Professor Pizzimenti's is the only study that evaluates
the effectiveness of existing infrastructure.5 Indeed, the main purpose of
Professor Pizzimenti's survey is to compare the rules governing conflicts
screens with the actual practice as reported by respondents.76 As noted,
Professor Pizzimenti concludes that current practices, both formal and
informal, are flawed. Moreover, given the low response rate to the
survey, one might suspect that current practices are even more flawed
than the findings suggest. Presumably, firms with the worst practices are
the least likely to respond to surveys about their internal practices. This
68. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 292-94.
69. See id. at 294-95.
70. Id. at 295.
71. Id. at 275, 309.
72. See id. at 309-10.
73. Id. at 311.
74. See infra Part II.B.3.
75. See generally Pizzimenti, supra note 11 (reporting and evaluating firms' responses to
questionnaires written in an attempt to determine "how well screens work in practice").
76. See id. at 306.
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points to a limitation of survey research for assessing the effectiveness
of ethical infrastructure.77
One solution may be to survey associates rather than (or in addition
to) partners. In Professor Fortney's peer review survey, for instance,
73% of managing partners reported that their firm has a principal or
committee to handle ethics and malpractice problems.7s In the survey of
billing practices, however, which drew from the same population of
Texas law firms, only 54% of associates reported that their firm has a
"system or policy for dealing with ethical concerns of attorneys. 79
Twenty-two percent of associates said that their firm had no such
system, and 24% did not know. ° Obviously, associates' awareness of a
system is a prerequisite for its effectiveness. Associates' awareness of
ethical infrastructure, therefore, may be a useful measure for survey
research.
D. Summary
The four surveys reviewed above provide an important starting
point for research on law firm ethical infrastructure. Not only do they
map the existence of specific structural controls within firms, they also
raise fundamental questions about the effectiveness of existing controls,
and suggest some means for investigating this issue. Nevertheless, they
are only a start. Two of the surveys rely on small, nonrandom samples of
firms; and the other two, while more systematic, only cover firms in one
state.8' Thus, we still lack basic data about what firms around the country
are doing and, more importantly, about what motivates firms to create
internal controls. Our project is designed to help fill this gap.
III. OUR RESEARCH AGENDA AND WORKING HYPOTHESES
Our project focuses on the process by which particular types of
ethical infrastructure become established within law firms. Informed by
77. Researchers may fare somewhat better with in-person interviews, to the extent that
lawyers and firms (and funders) are willing. Susan Shapiro's forthcoming study is based on personal
interviews with the lawyers most directly responsible for handling conflicts of interest, and
promises a "wealth of information" on "how firms seek to avoid conflicts, how they identify
potential or actual conflicts, evaluate them, [and] resolve them." Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1141-42.
78. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 289.
79. Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11, at 254.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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"institutional" theories of organizations,8 we view this process as driven
primarily by private, professional, and cultural incentives rather than by
regulatory incentives.' This is not to suggest that direct regulation is not
important, or that the threat of liability does not provide important
momentum for organizational change; but rather that the scope and pace
of change is not directly liability driven."4
Instead, institutional research shows that organizations take their
structural cues primarily from each other." Thus, organizations may
create internal compliance structures even in the absence of potential
liability, because other organizations have them and it seems like the
right thing to do.86 Likewise, organizations may do nothing, despite
exposure to liability, because both regulatory enforcement and
institutional accountability are weakY Finally, even when the creation of
internal compliance structures is motivated primarily by a perceived
threat of liability, organizations collectively play a central role in
defining the scope and effectiveness of such structures."
Thus, while legal ethics scholars and bar regulators tend to focus on
the content of formal rules and the scope of potential liability,
institutional theory calls attention to the regulatory process.9 The
82. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV.
147 (1983); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); Suchman & Edelman, Legal Rational Myths,
supra note 16 (explaining institutional and "new institutional" theories of organizations).
83. See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity Regulation,
4 LEGAL ETHICS 45, 56-64 (U.K.) (2002) (criticizing the command-and-control approach to law
firm discipline and calling instead for more attention to institutional incentives for self-regulation).
84. See Suchman & Edelman, Legal Rational Myths, supra note 16, at 923 & n.65 (finding
"considerable empirical support" for the notion that "compliant behavior is motivated more by
cultural norms and accounts than by the imminent threat of legal sanctions").
85. See Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal
Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform 1888-1935, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
22, 35 (1983); see also Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 16, at 498 (reviewing
research on the process of structural diffusion).
86. See Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1554-69 (examining the adoption of
equal employment policies, procedures, and offices in 346 organizations); Lauren B. Edelman,
Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the
American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1422-37 (1990) [hereinafter Edelman, Expansion of
Due Process] (examining the adoption of due process protections in fifty-two organizations);
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406, 412-19 (1999) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation] (examining employers' adoption of nonunion grievance procedures).
87. One might argue that this explains the lack of ethical infrastructure in some law firms.
88. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
89. See Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 16, at 502.
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introduction of new regulation is just the first stage of this process. As
Professors Lauren B. Edelman and Mark C. Suchman write:
If all legal doctrine were substantive and unequivocal and if all
legal implementation were coercive and undeviating, then one could
imagine a simple feedback loop, in which organizations would adjust
their behaviors exclusively in response to existing laws .... In the
[institutional] account, however, the plot-line is much messier than
this. Because the ambiguity of law-on-the-books is not an occasional
aberration but rather a political fact of life, the practical meaning of
any given law-in-action can only emerge through a highly interactive
process .... involv[ing] not only the official agents of the legal system
(regulators, judges, litigators, and the like), but also the members of the
focal organizational field (including individual firms, professional
groups, trade associations, media observers, and legal advisors).
Eventually these efforts may gradually produce a working agreement
on what the law "is" and what it "requires," and that agreement may
become reified and institutionalized in formal structures ...
nonetheless, to say that the legal rules "cause" the organization
practices . . . is, at best, a gross simplification."
The first stage of our project focuses on firms' creation of explicitly
"ethical" infrastructure, such as ethics committees and in-house ethics
advisors; and the extent to which firm managers actively support the use
of such infrastructure. From an institutional perspective, "ethics"
structures are especially important because they serve as a visible signal
of the firm's attention to high ethical standards. Further, ethics advisors,
as designated experts within the firm, are in a unique position to shape
the development of firm policies and procedures and to promote a
positive ethical culture in the firm. Our research to date consists of a
series of focus groups and informal interviews with law firm managers,
ethics advisors, firm general counsel, insurers, and regulators. Many of
the questions and working hypotheses that we discuss in this section are
informed by this exploratory research.
We also are interested in firms' creation of special purpose
infrastructure, including such structures as pro bono committees,
diversity committees, and sexual harassment committees, in addition to
the structures already discussed, such as those dealing with conflicts and
billing. As we explain below, the timing of firms' creation of special
purpose infrastructure may provide important evidence about firms'
incentives to create formal structural controls.
90. Id. at 501-02 (citation omitted).
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We assume that firm size is an important determinant of whether
firms create ethical infrastructure; however, we are more interested in
other sources of variation among firms. We, therefore, have limited our
research agenda to "large" (100-plus-lawyer) firms. Our research to date
suggests that the creation and use of ethical infrastructure varies
significantly even among large firms.
A. Descriptive Questions
The first goal of our project is to provide a "thick description" of
explicitly ethical infrastructure; that is, not just whether or not firms
have it, but also the scope of its jurisdiction, the frequency of its use, and
the formal and informal authority of the lawyers who manage it.9'
Consider ethics committees, for example. Based on the surveys reviewed
above, we assume that most large law firms have an "ethics" or
"professional responsibility" committee.92 We suspect, however, that not
all ethics committees are created equal. The power of a committee
depends on its jurisdiction over core organizational functions, and on the
status of the people who serve on the committee. We plan to investigate
these questions directly through in-depth interviews with law firm
managers and partners who serve on ethics committees. What is the
jurisdiction of the committee? Does it meet regularly or on an ad hoc
basis? How often does it meet? Who serves on the committee? Are they
elected or appointed? How often does membership on the committee
rotate among firm members? Is significant committee service
compensated by the firm?
We suspect that firms will invest more resources in committees
with economic jurisdictions than committees with aspirational
jurisdictions. For instance, we suspect that ethics committees that focus
primarily on conflicts of interest will be staffed by senior and/or
managing partners with specialized expertise, and will meet routinely
and often, because conflicts committees have jurisdiction over who gets
to keep what business. On the other hand, we suspect that ethics
committees that do not have jurisdiction over conflicts will meet less
often, and will be more likely to be staffed by rotation. These hypotheses
are consistent with the findings from previous research.93 We also
91. This term is borrowed from cultural anthropology. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick
Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3,
3-30 (1973).
92. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
93. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 284 (finding that "firms are more likely
to monitor compliance with office procedures relating to firm finances than procedures relating to
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suspect that, in some firms, the jurisdiction of the "ethics" committee
has changed over time, from a committee that focused primarily on
conflicts to a committee with a broader mandate. Thus, we are interested
in the age of ethics and conflicts committees, and, in firms that have
both, the relationship between them.
We also are interested in distinguishing between ethics committees
and ethics specialists. As noted above, we view firms' increasing
reliance on in-house ethics advisors as a potentially important
development, given the role of internal specialists in other regulatory
contexts. Our initial research suggests, however, that like ethics
committees, the role of in-house ethics advisors varies significantly from
firm to firm. In some firms, the ethics advisor's role is limited to
managing conflicts: a typical example would be a male senior partner
with significant litigation experience who is in charge of telling other
partners "no" when a potential conflict prevents representation. In one
multinational law firm that we know of, this is a formalized, full-time
job and the partner performing it has no outside clients. More typically,
it seems, this job is structured as a part-time committee duty for a
respected practicing partner.
Other firms have ethics advisors whose jobs are broader than
clearing conflicts and extend to a wide range of substantive and
procedural issues within the firm. For instance, some ethics advisors
provide individual counseling on professional disciplinary matters; help
the firm develop standardized procedures for raising and addressing
ethical questions; help the firm develop standardized forms, such as fee
contracts and conflict waivers; provide training seminars on ethical
issues that arise within the firm's practice; and develop intranet and
internet resources, such as a list of "frequently asked questions" with
links to formal ethics opinions. 9 If the firm has no labor law or human
resources department, ethics advisors also may handle tricky personnel
and human resource matters. In some firms, this job is structured as a
full-time job: the partner who holds it has no outside clients and is
compensated according to a different formula (and presumably at a
lower rate) than partners with outside billings. In other firms, the ethics
advisor bills the firm for in-house practice, but also maintains an outside
practice focusing on malpractice and disciplinary matters.
client representation matters"); Pizzimenti, supra note 11, at 322 (finding that most ethics
committees meet on an ad hoc, rather than regular, basis).
94. See Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 12, at 104-08 (describing their in-house ethics practice at
Stoel Rives LLP, a 300-plus-lawyer firm based in Portland, Oregon).
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Finally, some firms have more than one partner who specializes in
what we are broadly defining as "in-house ethics advising." For instance,
one firm that we know of has three different specialists: a general
counsel, who focuses on conflicts; a full-time ethics advisor, whose job
is broader; and a practicing partner who serves as the liaison to the
firm's malpractice insurer. In another firm, the general counsel focuses
on claims and loss prevention and the ethics committee focuses on
conflicts.
We are especially interested in the prevalence of full-time ethics
advisors and part-time ethics advisors who are compensated for this
function. We suspect that whether or not ethics advisors are
compensated may affect both the scope and quality of in-house ethics
advising. For instance, ethics advisors who are compensated for this
function may be more likely than uncompensated committee members to
take a proactive role in developing firm-wide ethics controls. Thus, firms
with compensated ethics advisors may tend to have more ethical
infrastructure than firms without compensated ethics advisors.
On the other hand, the mere creation of a specialized, compensated
position does not guarantee the ethics advisor's authority within the
firm. For instance, full-time ethics advisors without outside billings may
not command the respect of their partners, especially if they were never
practicing partners in the firm. Thus, we suspect that the professional
status of those charged with ethics advising-including their tenure at
the firm and the degree to which they enjoy visible support from top
management-also may be a key determinant of the ethics advisor's
role. We plan to begin to test these hypotheses through in-depth
interviews with a small sample of in-house ethics advisors.
In addition to asking about the age and jurisdiction of explicitly
ethical infrastructure, we plan to interview law firm managers about the
overall management structure of the firm, including the age and
jurisdiction of special purpose infrastructure. We also plan to ask law
firm managers why they adopted specific ethical infrastructure, in hopes
of gaining some understanding of firms' incentives to create formal
structural controls.
B. Incentive Questions
The second goal of our project is to begin to address the question of
why firms create ethical infrastructure. According to institutional
research on the regulatory process, organizations' creation of internal
compliance structures occurs in three roughly chronological stages:
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(1) the introduction of new regulation; (2) the testing of structural
responses to regulation by first-mover organizations; and (3) a process of
"institutional isomorphism 95 whereby other organizations in the
regulatory community copy successful (legitimated) structures at an
increasing rate.96
Informed by this model, our inquiry is organized around the
following questions. First, who are the first movers? What types of firms
have taken the lead in creating ethical infrastructure? Secondly, what are
the mechanisms of structural diffusion among firms? That is, how do
firms get information about what other firms are doing?
1. Who are the First Movers?
Institutional research suggests that first movers tend to be those
organizations subject to the most regulatory scrutiny: for instance, large
organizations, public organizations, and private organizations with
administrative linkages to the federal government.97 This research
suggests that ethical infrastructure will emerge first in response to
regulatory exposure: for instance, in firms that have suffered regulatory
sanctions; firms that represent regulated clients; and firms with a
significant litigation practice (because of the potential for judicial
sanctions).
So far, however, institutional research has focused exclusively on
public and business organizations, rather than professional organizations
such as law firms. Most lawyers we speak to explain law firm structure
and culture in terms of individual leadership; that is, as a reflection of
the professional values of senior and managing partners. This
explanation is consistent with previous research showing the importance
of professional ideology in the development of management structures
within law firms.98 Thus, it may be that law firms respond to different
incentives than public and business organizations.
95. In biology, "isomorphic" organisms differ in ancestry but have similar form. See RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1014 (2d ed. 1987). "'[I]nstitutional
isomorphism' refers to the process by which "organizations facing the same cultural rules and
understandings become ... increasingly similar to one another." Edelman & Suchman, Legal
Environments, supra note 16, at 496.
96. See Chambliss, supra note 83, at 56-59 (explaining the institutional model of the
regulatory process).
97. See, e.g., Edelman, Expansion of Due Process, supra note 86, at 1422-37; Edelman, Legal
Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1554-69.
98. See, e.g., ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 79, 205-06, 218 (Ind. Univ. Press 1973) (1969) (suggesting that law firms
are structured by the professional values of firm members); William G. Ouchi, Markets,
Bureaucracies and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SC. Q. 129 passim (1980). But see NELSON, supra note 17, at
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One way to test the importance of regulatory incentives is to
investigate the timing of firms' creation of special purpose
infrastructure. To the extent that regulatory incentives are important in
determining who are the first movers, we would expect that the purpose
and/or jurisdiction of the infrastructure would reflect the regulatory
incentive. For instance, firms that have been sanctioned for filing a
frivolous motion should be among the first firms to require two
signatures on all filings. Likewise, firms that practice securities law
should be among the first firms to create opinion letter committees.
Finally, firms with a substantial litigation practice should be among the
first firms to create formal procedures for identifying conflicts of
interest. 9
Another way to investigate firms' sensitivity to regulatory
incentives is to track firms' response to widely-publicized enforcement
actions against law firms. For instance, we suspect that the sexual
harassment suit against Chicago-based firm Baker & McKenzie, which
resulted in a multi-million dollar punitive damages award,'00 prompted
some firms (but not others) to establish sexual harassment committees.
Examining whether-and when-firms created sexual harassment
committees, therefore, may help to identify characteristics that affect
firms' response to regulatory incentives.
We are less confident about how to measure the role of regulatory
incentives in firms' creation of general purpose infrastructure, such as
ethics committees and in-house ethics advisors. Currently, there is no
regulation requiring firms to have an ethics committee or an in-house
ethics advisor-except, arguably, partners' supervisory duties under
Model Rule 5.1(a). °1 Further, although New York and New Jersey
recently have imposed supervisory duties on law firms as entities, 1 2
most lawyers and regulators to whom we have spoken do not expect
much enforcement against large firms. Experience teaches that
205-28 (arguing that firm elites define "professionalism" to justify whatever structures the firm has
in place).
99. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 828
(1992) (noting that judicial disqualification for conflicts of interest played an important role in
promoting the development of effective conflict-avoidance systems within firms).
100. See Richard C. Reuben, Award a Lesson for Firns: Baker & McKenzie Ex-Partner to Pay
$7.1 Million, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 19, 19.
101. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 1018 (stating that "though Model Rule 5.1(a) cannot be said
to prescribe that every law firm establish an ethics committee, the drafters. . . clearly considered an
ethics committee to be a significant measure in meeting the generalized duty prescribed by
the Rule").
102. See sources cited supra note 15.
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disciplinary proceedings against lawyers who work in large law firms
are relatively rare.'0 3
Some commentators explain firms' increasing reliance on in-house
ethics advisors as a response to the growth of malpractice litigation and
the increasing complexity of legal ethics as a substantive area of law.'O
Presumably, however, these developments affect all law firms to some
extent; thus, they do not suggest a hypothesis about which firms will be
first to respond. One possibility is that the location of the firm is
important. It is noteworthy, for instance, that Peter Jarvis, an in-house
ethics advisor since the mid-1980s and co-author of the case study on
ethics advising,' 5 practices in Oregon, the only state with mandatory
malpractice insurance.'"
Another possibility is that the identity of the firm's insurer matters.
For instance, a number of ethics advisors to whom we have spoken
practice in firms insured by the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
("ALAS"). ALAS, which is owned by its members, has been especially
proactive in providing loss prevention counseling to insureds; and ALAS
requires its insureds to designate a liaison within the firm.'"" In a number
of firms that we know of, the ALAS liaison is also the in-house ethics
advisor. Thus, it may be that firms insured by ALAS have been among
the first firms to designate in-house ethics advisors.
Institutional theory would suggest that law firms create explicitly
"ethical" infrastructure in part to signal their high ethical standards to
key constituents, such as clients and potential firm members.'0 In their
description of their own in-house ethics practice, for instance, Peter
Jarvis and Mark Fucile note that firm members use the presence of in-
house ethics advisors as a selling point when recruiting law students.'9
As they state: "A firm that expressly devotes personnel to ethics issues is
103. See Schneyer, supra note 14, at 6; see also Schneyer, supra note 7, at 247-54 (discussing
the insignificance of professional discipline for the development of ethical infrastructure within law
firms); Wilkins, supra note 99, at 822-35, 869-72 (explaining why so few disciplinary actions are
brought against lawyers who work in large law firms).
104. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 1018, 1028-29; Jarvis, supra note 10, at 15.
105. See sources cited supra note 12.
106. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1657, 1662 n.28 (1994). Oregon adopted mandatory insurance in 1978. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 9.080(2) (1999); Resolution Adopted by the Oregon State Bar at its November 1977 Bar
Convention (effective July 1, 1978).
107. See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative
Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 340 (1997).
108. See Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 86, at 416-18; Edelman,
Legal Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1542-45.
109. See Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 12, at 112.
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telling its lawyers that it cares about those issues and their resolution.""
Again, however, the question remains as to which firms are first to
create in-house ethics advisors. In other words, which firms are most
sensitive to "institutional" incentives?
At this stage, we can only speculate about the role of regulatory and
institutional incentives in firms' creation of ethical infrastructure, and
the sources of variation among firms. We plan to investigate these
questions further as our research progresses.
2. Mechanisms of Structural Diffusion
We are likewise speculative about the mechanisms of structural
diffusion among firms. We suspect that in-house ethics advisors may
play an important role, especially insofar as they participate in specialist
networks outside of the firm. Institutional research consistently finds
that the presence of lawyers and other compliance specialists within
business organizations is a significant determinant of whether-and
when-the organization adopts internal regulatory controls.' Internal
specialists act as conduits for regulatory information, and thus tend to
increase the organization's responsiveness to regulation g6nerally.'
2
Further, internal specialists tend to network through associations and
conferences, professional journals, and electronic list-serves, hastening
the spread of information and the diffusion of new structural forms."'
We suspect, therefore, that the emergence of networks among in-house
ethics advisors may be an important mechanism of structural diffusion
among firms.
110. Id.
111. See Frank Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor
Markets, 99 AM. J. Soc. 396, 404 (1993) (finding that "[p]ersonnel professionals played a central
role" in the formalization of internal labor markets as a response to equal employment law);
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1565 (finding that organizations with personnel
departments created equal employment opportunity policies at "almost twice the rate of other
organizations"); Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 16, at 807-08 (finding that personnel officers and
labor lawyers were central to the institutionalization of grievance procedures in private firms);
Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 16, at 498-501 (reviewing research on the
role of professionals in shaping organizations' responses to regulation).
112. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 82, at 152-54; Edelman & Suchman, Legal
Environments, supra note 16, at 499; Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 16, at 800-01.
113. See Edelman, Expansion of Due Process, supra note 86, at 1434-35; John R. Sutton et al.,
The Legalization of the Wor place, 99 AM. J. Soc. 944, 966 (1994) (finding that "organizations that
are structurally linked to the wider national environment through ... []personnel officers and labor




Recent legal ethics scholarship suggests that malpractice insurers
also may be important."4 Like ethics advisors, malpractice insurers are in
a position to provide expertise about sources of potential liability and
mechanisms for promoting compliance. Malpractice insurers may
promote the diffusion of ethical infrastructure in a number of ways:
through the creation of policy provisions and exclusions; through the
provision of risk management services; and, increasingly, through direct
audits of law firm management practices."15 ALAS, for instance, has an
annual conference in which it reviews recent malpractice verdicts and
disseminates "best practice" information to member firms."16 Thus, we
suspect that firms with proactive insurers may have more extensive
ethical infrastructure than firms without proactive insurers. Further, we
suspect that firms with the same insurer will tend to have similar ethical
infrastructure. Again, we plan to investigate these issues in the second
stage of our research.
3. The Effectiveness Question
Obviously a central question that demands systematic research is
what difference it makes whether firms create formal ethical
infrastructure. To what extent do formal policies and procedures actually
shape lawyers' conduct within the firm? Are they simply window
dressing to stave off outside regulation? Are they even potentially
harmful, in that they provide an excuse for individual lawyers to duck
tough ethical decisions?
Many lawyers to whom we have spoken in developing our research
agenda have told us that what really matters is the culture of the firm;
and that formal policies and procedures are largely irrelevant to lawyers'
conduct. The argument, essentially, is that good lawyers will be ethical
regardless of the presence (or absence) of formal infrastructure; and that
bad lawyers, likewise, will find a way to circumvent whatever formal
structures are in place.
This argument, however, is not inconsistent with our "institutional"
approach. The central premise of institutional theory is that
organizations are motivated primarily by cultural norms and
114. See Cohen, supra note 107, at 339-41; Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers
as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996) (examining whether or not
malpractice insurance carriers possess the capability to informally regulate those that they insure).
115. See Davis, supra note 114, at 211-22.
116. See Cohen, supra note 107, at 340; Rita Henley Jensen, Malpractice Rates May Level Off,
NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1993, at 1.
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expectations rather than by material or technical concerns." 7 Indeed,
institutional theory arose as a response to neoclassical theories of
organizations, which portray organizations as driven primarily by
rational calculations of economic efficiency."8 Institutional theory does
not suggest that organizations are not rational, but rather that economic
rationality is shaped by institutional norms."9
Thus, institutional research on organizations' responses to
regulation, which focuses on the creation and diffusion of formal
compliance structures within firms, does not assume that such structures
necessarily are effective in securing compliance; or that the adoption of
formal structures is the end of the story. Instead, institutional theory
views the creation of internal compliance structures as culturally
symbolic.' In other words, institutional theory views formal structure as
part of the culture of the firm. As Jarvis's and Fucile's observation about
the recruiting value of in-house ethics advisors suggests, firms that adopt
formal ethics structures are signaling to lawyers (and, institutional
theory would add, to regulators) that the firm takes ethical issues
seriously."'
This point has several important implications for inquiries about
"effectiveness." First, from an institutional standpoint, even purely
symbolic structures are in some sense "effective," in that they-by
definition-alter the culture of the firm. Thus, institutional theory draws
a distinction between a firm with no formal policy, and one in which the
formal policy is inconsistent with actual conduct.
Second, institutional research suggests that even purely symbolic
structures, over time, may take on a substantive bite. Formal policies
provide ammunition for reform-minded individuals, as well as for those
who would invoke them, to advance their own economic and/or
professional interests (such as in-house compliance specialists)." In
Professor Fortney's study of billing practices, for instance, seventy-one
117. See Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 16, at 484-506 (contrasting
"material" and "cultural" theories of organizations).
118. See generally W. RICHARD Scorr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN
SYSTEMS 76-101 (1998) (reviewing theoretical approaches to the study of organizations).
119. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 82, at 153-54.
120. See Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1542-47; Meyer & Rowan, supra
note 82, at 346-52.
121. See Jarvis &Fucile, supra note 12, at 112.
122. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance:
Affirmative Action Officers' Dilemma, 13 LAw & POL'Y 73, 75 (1991) (arguing that, once
implemented, symbolic structures "tend to develop a life of their own," in part through mobilization
by politically motivated specialists); see also Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra
note 16, at 505.
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percent of respondents agreed that "'[c]lear billing guidelines would




Finally, consistent with its emphasis on cultural norms and
expectations, institutional theory assumes that, in general, firm managers
seek compliance with regulation.' 24 Thus, while some approaches to
organizational regulation-such as, for instance, the command-and-
control approach associated with professional discipline-tend to
portray the targets of regulation as resistant to regulatory demands,
institutional theory focuses on the process of organizational
compliance. 5 Institutional theory assumes that firms that create formal
compliance structures probably intend to promote compliance (though
the meaning of "compliance" may be contested).
Of course, none of this answers the empirical question about the
effects of ethical infrastructure on lawyers' day-to-day conduct. We
submit, however, that this is in fact an empirical question, and not one to
be assumed away by pitting "structure" against "culture" as if they were
unrelated. On the contrary, a substantial body of research on
organizations finds that organizational structure and culture are
dynamically related.'26 From this perspective, tracking the creation and
diffusion of ethical infrastructure is an essential component of any
inquiry into law firms' ethical culture.
This being said, how can we measure the effects of formal ethical
infrastructure on lawyers' day-to-day conduct? We already have
suggested one possible measure: that is, associates' awareness of ethical
infrastructure and their propensity to use it. Thus, one strategy is to ask
lawyers, and particularly associates, directly about the effectiveness of
ethical infrastructure in their firm. Associates, however, are unlikely to
have access to the most interesting data, and, as noted above, most
partners will be reluctant to discuss specific ethical problems-
especially those involving the failure of formal ethical infrastructure.
Indeed, we have yet to hear one story from a partner about a significant
ethical lapse that occurred within that partner's firm. There are limits,
therefore, on outsiders' ability to assess the effectiveness of ethical
infrastructure.
123. Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 11, at 253-54.
124. See Edelman, LegalAmbiguity, supra note 16, at 1544.
125. See Chambliss & Edelman, supra note 19, manuscript at 2 (contrasting legal/coercive
versus sociological/institutional models of the regulatory process).
126. See, e.g., Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 16, at 1542; Suchman & Edelman, Legal
Rational Myths, supra note 16, at 909-13.
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PROMOTING ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Insiders certainly can do so, however. That is, firms themselves can
engage in self-study to evaluate the effectiveness of their own
infrastructure. For instance, Jarvis and Fucile note that an important part
of their role as in-house ethics advisors is to alert firm managers to
potential ethical problems and help them design a response.'"
Presumably, evaluating the effectiveness of internal procedures also is a
central part of general counsels' jobs. While we recognize that
promoting self-study in this context somewhat begs the question, in that
self-study is itself a form of ethical infrastructure, the only alternative
would seem to be to abandon the inquiry altogether. Given the
profession's duty of self-regulation-not to mention recent events
involving malfeasance by professional firms-we do not view this as a
defensible alternative. Thus, we argue for shifting the burden of
researching effectiveness to firms. At the very least, we view the burden
of defending the absence of ethical infrastructure as falling squarely on
firms.
Bar associations can encourage self-study by law firms in a number
of ways. First, the bar can encourage law firms to designate in-house
ethics advisors. Ethics advisors have a professional incentive to promote
high ethical standards and to maximize the importance of ethics
regulation as an area of law.2' Thus, ethics advisors are likely to
promote the development of ethical infrastructure within firms and to
monitor the effectiveness of internal policies and procedures.'9
The bar should also encourage journalists and professional research
organizations to include questions about firms' ethical infrastructure in
their surveys. For instance, the National Law Journal's annual survey of
the largest U.S. law firms could include a question about whether the
firm has an in-house ethics advisor and/or a system for insuring ethical
conduct within the firm. The National Association for Law Placement
("NALP"), likewise, publishes an annual directory of legal employers
for use by law school placement offices that already includes a number
of questions about firms' ethical infrastructure, such as the firm's pro
bono policy and whether the firm has a diversity committee.'3" The
NALP survey could be expanded to include additional questions, such as
127. See Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 12, at 106-07.
128. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 1028-29, 1041-42.
129. See Chambliss, supra note 83, at 60-63 (arguing that the American Bar Association
should promote the authority and professional organization of in-house ethics advisors, and
explaining the potential benefits of this strategy).




whether the firm has a formal system addressing associates' ethical
questions.
Most ambitiously, the bar could require firms to report on their
ethical infrastructure and publish the aggregated results. Professor Irwin
Miller argues for such a requirement under Model Rule 5.1(a).'31 Or the
bar could simply encourage voluntary reporting, and publish a list of
firms that participate.
Finally, the bar should support academic research on law firms'
ethical infrastructure. In her survey of peer review procedures, for
instance, Professor Fortney credits her high response rate in part to the
fact that the survey was partially funded by the Texas Bar Foundation,
which Texas lawyers view "as a prestigious group that funds worthy
projects."'' 2 We submit that in the inevitable rethinking of professional
self-regulation in the post-Enron era, such funds are well spent.
IV. CONCLUSION
We believe that the design and implementation of effective ethical
infrastructure is critical to the future integrity of private law practice.
The growth and globalization of law firms and the emergence of new
organizational forms, such as multidisciplinary partnerships, have
radically altered the conditions of practice and professional self-
regulation. Regulators, in the United States and elsewhere, currently are
grappling with a variety of proposals to insure the effectiveness of
professional regulation in a global, multidisciplinary market. Although
these efforts are at an exploratory stage, the one thing regulators agree
upon is the need to move beyond the individualistic paradigm that
currently dominates professional regulation and to focus on the
development of self-regulatory structures within firms.
131. See Miller, supra note 14, at 319-20.
132. Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 9, at 277.
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